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Animalism, persistence conditions, 
subjecthood, and aporia 
(Chris Hughes) 
 
 
I 
 
Animalism has been ably defended by (at least) Peter van Inwagen, Eric 
Olson, and Paul Snowdon, and has many attractions. Indeed, when I read 
The Human Animal, my initial reaction was something like: why isn’t 
everyone an animalist? In what follows, I shall set out some of the 
reasons I am less surprised than I once was about the controversiality of 
animalism. 
 
 
II 
 
What exactly animalism is, is an interesting and delicate question. But 
for our purposes, it will be enough to say that (as I understand it) 
animalism will be a view that has the following consequences: 
 
(A) Necessarily, human persons are essentially human animals. 
(B) Necessarily, animals (and hence human animals) have biological 
persistence conditions, and go on only as long as their biological 
lives continue. 
(C) We are human persons. 
 
Why think of animalism as implying all these views? Why not say, 
instead, that animalism is just the view that human persons are animals? 
For various reasons, some of which will emerge later in this paper. But 
for now, suppose someone had the following view: 
 
Human persons are currently human animals, and indeed human persons 
are permanently human animals. Be that as it may, a human person has 
both a material body and an immaterial mind. And if a human being were 
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‘pared down’ to its immaterial mind, it would go on existing (in virtue of 
retaining its immaterial mind), but would cease to be a human animal, or 
for that matter an animal, (in virtue of the fact that embodiment and 
materiality are required for something to be an animal (though not for 
something that is (in fact, currently) an animal to exist)). 
 
On this view, each human person is identical to some human animal (in 
the same way that each human being is identical to some resident of 
earth (at least, if only human beings that existed in the past or present 
or included in the domain of quantification). Even so, the view just 
described is surely not animalism in the usual sense: animalists (from 
Thomas Aquinas right through to van Inwagen, Olson, and Snowdon) 
deny that human persons are, but only accidentally are, human animals, 
in the way that (past or present) human persons are, but only 
accidentally are, terrestrial residents. Moreover, as well as holding that 
human persons are essentially human animals, animalists hold that 
human persons, qua human persons, are essentially human animals. 
Consider the statement: every (material) human artefact is visible to the 
naked eye. At one time, certainly, all the (material) human artefacts 
there were visible to the naked eye. And if history had gone differently, 
and human beings had become extinct before they ever became 
technologically advanced enough to make (material) artefacts that are 
too small to be seen with the naked eye, then it would have been true 
that all the (material) human artefacts there ever have been or ever will 
be are visible to the naked eye. More than that, I imagine it would under 
those circumstances be true that every (material) human artefact there 
ever was or ever will be is essentially visible to the naked eye. (Consider, 
say an ordinary table, or button. Surely that very artefact could not have 
been too small to be seen by the naked eye). Still, even in the 
circumstances envisioned, it would not be true that (material) human 
artefacts, qua (material) human artefacts, are visible, or essentially 
visible, to the naked eye, because it would not be true that being a 
(material) human artefact implied being visible to the naked eye or being 
essentially visible to the naked eye. Thus, even in the envisioned 
circumstances, it would not be true that necessarily, all (material) human 
artefacts are essentially visible. I take it that animalists want to say: 
 
It’s not as though — as it happens — all the human persons there actually 
are (all the human persons there ever actually have been or ever actually 
will be) are essentially human animals, although there might have been 
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human persons that were not essentially human animals (in much the way 
that, perhaps, all the art works there ever actually have been or ever 
actually will be essentially do not coincide with any thing which is both a 
sphere with a diameter of one mile, and made of pure gold). It is instead 
that human persons, as such, are essentially human animals: being a human 
person implies being essentially a human animal. 
 
That is why I’ve said that animalism implies (A), and not just the much 
weaker claim that every human person is (identical to) a human animal. 
But, although I take it that you cannot be an animalist without accepting 
(A), you could accept (A) without being an animalist, if you had the 
following view: 
 
Human persons are purely immaterial beings. Also, human persons are not 
accidentally but essentially human persons. Moreover, human persons are 
essentially capable of being embodied by a human body. And necessarily, 
whatever is possibly embodied by a human being is eo ipso actually a 
human animal (in the same way that anything that could possibly die is eo 
ipso actually mortal). So even though human persons are purely 
immaterial beings, it is necessarily true that human persons are essentially 
human animals, because necessarily, whoever is a human person will be 
capable of embodiment by a human body in any world in which he or she 
exists, and so will be a human animal in any world in which he or she exists. 
 
Animalists want to exclude that a human person could be a human 
animal simply in virtue of his or her capabilities (or simply in virtue of 
his or her history): for that would allow someone to grant (A), but insist 
that human persons can go on existing, and indeed go on being animals, 
without the right sort of biological events going on (say, without a 
certain living human body continuing to be a living human body). And 
(B) rules out this last possibility. 
Suppose, now, that a philosopher held that (necessarily) a human body 
= a human person = a human animal, and that a human 
body/person/animal has biological persistence conditions. Suppose, 
though, that this philosopher also maintained that what we are, are the 
immaterial Cartesian minds that ‘control’ (and more generally are 
causally related in the right way to) human bodies/persons/animals. 
This view is compatible with the conjunction of (A) and (B), but surely is 
incompatible with animalism: as Snowdon emphasizes, animalism is a 
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thesis about what we human person are (not just about what human 
persons are). Hence (C). 
 
 
III 
 
A number of philosophers, from Descartes to Richard Swinburne, have 
argued from the premiss that our surviving disembodiment is 
(metaphysically) possible to the conclusion that we do not have a purely 
material constitution. One could also move from that premiss to the 
conclusion that animalism is false, via (what I shall call) Argument 1: 
 
o A human person’s surviving disembodiment (that is, still existing, 
despite now being disembodied) is metaphysically possible. 
o A human animal’s retaining its human animality despite 
disembodiment (that is, still being a human animal, despite now being 
disembodied), is metaphysically impossible. [Since human animality 
implies embodiment (that is to say, it cannot be true – at a time, in a 
possible world – that an individual is a human animal, unless it is true 
– at that time, in the world – that that individual is embodied)]. 
-------------------------- 
o So it is not necessary that human persons are essentially human 
animals: it is at least possible that there are human persons who either 
are only accidentally human animals, or are not human animals at all. 
In which case (A) is false; in which case animalism is false. 
 
The core of Argument 1 has the following form: 
 
o It is (metaphysically) possible for a (kind of thing) K to still exist, 
despite having ceased to be F. 
o It is (metaphysically) impossible for a K’ to still be a K’, despite having 
ceased to be F. 
-------------------------- 
o So, it is not (metaphysically) necessarily that all Ks are essentially K’s 
– i.e. it is at least (metaphysically) possible for a K to be either only 
accidentally a K’, or not a K at all. 
 
Since the above form is (logically) valid, so is Argument 1. The animalist 
will accordingly have to deny that it is (logically) sound. I take it that the 
151 
 
animalist will want to endorse the second premiss. After all, if a human 
animal could retain its human animality in a disembodied state, then—
even assuming (A) — it’s hard to see how we’ll get (B): if human animals 
could go on existing without going on being embodied, how could it be 
that human animals could not go on existing, unless their biological life 
went on? 
So it appears that the animalist will have to (and will) take issue with the 
argument’s first premiss — that is, the claim that it is (metaphysically) 
possible that a human person’s surviving disembodiment (that is, still 
existing, despite now being disembodied) is (metaphysically) possible. 
Why, an animalist might say, should anyone accept that premiss? 
Well, the anti-animalist might reply that a human person’s surviving 
disembodiment looks possible. Consider Argument 2: 
 
o An oak tree’s surviving (complete) “dematerialization” is 
(metaphysically) possible. (A thing (completely) dematerializes if it 
loses all its material parts.) 
o A plant’s retaining its planthood despite (complete) dematerialization 
is (metaphysically) impossible (since planthood implies materiality). 
-------------------------- 
o So it is not necessary that oak trees are essentially plants; it is at least 
possible that there are oak trees that either are only accidentally 
plants, or are not plants at all. So “plantism” (about oak trees) is false. 
 
No one would endorse Argument 2, because its first premiss does not 
appear to be true:  an oak tree’s surviving (complete) 
“dematerialization” does not look possible. By contrast, various 
philosophers, from Descartes to Swinburne — would endorse the modal 
argument against animalism under consideration, because its first 
premiss appears to be true. To be sure, the fact that something looks 
possible is not a conclusive reason for thinking that it is possible. But it 
is a defeasible reason for thinking that it is possible. In the absence of 
reasons to deny or at least doubt that it is possible, it is reasonable to 
accept that it not only looks but is possible. And in the case at issue, 
there are no reasons to deny or doubt that the premiss (a human person’s 
surviving disembodiment….is (metaphysically) possible) is true. 
 
At this point, a defender of animalism might naturally object that we 
need to distinguish the question of whether it is possible for a human 
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person to survive disembodiment from the question of whether it is 
metaphysically possible for a human person to survive disembodiment. 
There are a number of ways the defender of animalism might develop 
this point. 
Suppose, for example, that she accepts the sort of ‘two-dimensional’ 
account of modality articulated and defended by David Chalmers. On 
Chalmers’ account of modality, we depart from the Carnapian idea that 
both terms and sentences have a unique intension. Instead, we suppose 
that terms and sentences have both a primary and a secondary 
intension. Oversimplifying in ways I hope will be immaterial to our 
concerns (e.g. neglecting the distinction between uncentered and 
centered worlds), the primary intension of the term water picks out, at a 
given possible world w, the clear drinkable liquid in the rivers, lakes, and 
oceans of w (whether that liquid is H2O, or, say, Putnam’s XYZ); by 
contrast the secondary intension of ‘water’ picks out at a given possible 
world w, what the primary intension of the term ‘water’ picks out in the 
actual world—which is to say, H2O. Analogously, the primary intension 
of the sentence water often freezes is the set of possible worlds w such that 
the substance picked out by the primary intension of water in w is an 
element of the set picked out by the primary intension of often freezes in 
w. Hence the primary intension of water often freezes will include possible 
worlds in which there is no H2O , and XYZ is the clear, drinkable liquid 
in the rivers lakes and oceans, and XYZ often freezes. The secondary 
intension of the sentence water often freezes is the set of possible worlds 
w such that the substance picked out by the secondary intension of water 
in w is an element of the set picked out by the secondary intension of 
often freezes in w. Hence the secondary intension of water often freezes will 
not include any H2O-less possible world w, even if the primary intension 
of water picks out something in w that is an element of the set picked out 
by the primary intension of often freezes in w. A sentence of the form 
water is F will be primarily necessary just in case every possible world is an 
element of its primary intension, and secondarily necessary just in case 
every possible world is an element of its secondary intension. Chalmers 
calls primary necessity epistemic necessity (though to my mind, conceptual 
necessity might be a more apt term) and identifies epistemic necessity 
with a priori knowability; he calls secondary necessity metaphysical 
necessity. Thus water is extended will be epistemically as well as 
metaphysically necessary, but water is non-homeomerous will be 
epistemically contingent, though metaphysically necessary. 
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An animalist who thinks of modality in the way Chalmers does might 
challenge argument 1 as follows: 
 
For sure, a human person’s surviving disembodiment looks possible. 
Indeed, a human person’s surviving disembodiment is possible. That is to 
say, it is primarily or epistemically possible (unlike a tree’s surviving 
dematerialization). After all, it cannot be excluded a priori that human 
persons are purely immaterial Cartesian beings that are embodied as long 
as, and only as long as, they stand in the right causal relations to some 
body. But why suppose that a human person’s surviving disembodiment is 
secondarily or metaphysically possible? As Locke emphasized long ago in 
his discussion of the possibility of “thinking matter”, we cannot exclude a 
priori that the beings human person refers to in the actual world are purely 
material beings. And if the beings that human person refers to are purely 
material beings, then there is no obvious reason to think that the 
secondary intension of human person picks out any individual in any 
possible world that survives disembodiment. Hence there is no obvious 
reason to think it is secondarily or metaphysically possible for a human 
person to survive disembodiment.  
 
Naturally, an animalist does not need to find? Chalmers’ (controversial) 
“two-dimensionalist” account of modality congenial. But even an 
animalist who does not sign up to two-dimensionalism about modality 
can still distinguish what cannot be excluded a priori (and (a priori) looks 
possible) from what is in fact metaphysically possible, and argue that we 
cannot move from the non-a-priori-excludability of human persons 
survive disembodiment to its metaphysical possibility, any more than we 
can move from the non-a-priori-excludability of water is homeomerous to 
its metaphysical possibility. Just as water’s being homeomerous is 
metaphysically impossible, despite its non-a-priori-excludability, given 
what water actually refers to, a human person’s surviving 
disembodiment may well be metaphysically impossible, despite its non-
a-priori-excludability, given what human person actually refers to. 
  
To see how the proponent of argument 1 might respond to this 
objection, it will be helpful to consider Argument 3: 
 
o A human person’s surviving (simultaneous) disembodiment and 
“dismindment” (that is, still existing, despite no longer having a body 
or a mind) is metaphysically possible. 
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o A human animal’s retaining its human animality despite 
(simultaneous) disembodiment and “dismindment” (that is, still being 
a human animal, despite no longer having a body or a mind), is 
metaphysically impossible - since human animality implies having a 
body or a mind (that is to say, it can not be true (at a time, in a possible 
world) that an individual is a human animal, unless it is true (at that 
time, in that world) that that individual has a body or a mind). 
-------------------------- 
o So it is not necessary that human persons are essentially human 
animals: it is at least possible that there are human persons that either 
are only accidentally human animals, or are not human animals at all. 
In which case (A) is false; in which case animalism is false. 
  
Argument 3, unlike argument 2, would not be endorsed by dualists such 
as Descartes or Swinburne, and is manifestly unconvincing, inasmuch as 
a human person’s existing in a disembodied and disminded state does 
not look possible. We can make sense of the idea of a human person’s 
still existing, but no longer having a body. And arguably (as animalists 
suppose) we can make sense of the idea of a human person still existing, 
but no longer (or not yet) having a mind. What I – and I take it we – have 
difficulty making sense of, is the idea of a human person’s still existing, 
despite being both bodiless and mindless (or the idea of a human person 
now in existence having already existed, despite then being both 
bodiless and mindless).  
There is a more general point here. If we think that there are individuals 
that have neither “bodily” characteristics (in a broad enough sense of 
“bodily” to allow that non-biological as well as biological beings have 
bodily characteristics), nor mental characteristics, then we will 
obviously have no trouble with the idea that individuals of that kind can 
exist in a mindless and bodiless state: a mathematical Platonist will 
think it’s true, and a fortiori metaphysically possible, that the number π 
exists without having either a body or a mind. But, so far as I can see, if 
we think of individuals as having either bodily or mental characteristics, 
we have great difficulty thinking of individuals of that kind existing in a 
bodiless and mindless state. Incidentally, I think this comes into the 
explanation of why we find the argument against plantism from possible 
dematerialization hopeless. We think of an oak tree as unlike π, 
inasmuch as it has bodily characteristics. But we think of an oak tree as 
like π, inasmuch as it lacks—and, I am inclined to say, essentially lacks—
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mental characteristics. According to ancient mythologies, oak trees 
were “inhabited by” things with minds (things that had or perhaps were 
minds)—dryads. And I think I can conceive of trees being inhabited by 
dryads. But it’s the dryad inhabiting the tree, and not the tree itself, that 
would have the mind (and the mental characteristics): I can’t make 
anything of the idea of a tree’s having a mind.  
If, however, 
 
(a)  whatever has either bodily or mental characteristics, could not exist 
without having either bodily or mental characteristics 
and 
(b) a tree essentially lacks mental characteristics, 
then 
(c)  a tree could not survive (complete) dematerialization, 
given that  
(d) (complete) dematerialization implies the loss of all bodily 
characteristics. 
 
To return to our main point: if we can make sense of the idea of a human 
person’s existing in a disembodied state, that is only because we can 
make sense of the idea of a human person’s existing in a minded-though-
disembodied state. 
And if we can make sense of the idea of a human person’s existing in a 
minded-though-disembodied state, then we can make sense of the idea 
of a human person’s existing, not just without bodily parts, but also 
without any “extra-mental” parts at all—that is, without any parts that 
are disjoint from (do not overlap with) her mind. After all, it doesn’t look 
as though human persons have some essential part which is neither 
mental nor bodily: as we think of it, there is “nothing more to” a human 
person than her body and her mind. So someone who thinks that a 
human person’s existing without bodily parts is metaphysically 
possible, should and will likewise think that a human person’s existing 
without extra-mental parts is metaphysically possible. 
Now anyone who thinks it is metaphysically possible for a human person 
to exist without extra-mental parts is in a position to offer Argument 4 
against animalism: 
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o A human person’s still existing, despite not having extra-mental 
parts, and not inhabiting anything with extra-mental parts, is 
metaphysically possible. 
o A human animal’s retaining its human animality despite not having 
extra-mental parts, and not inhabiting anything with extra-mental 
parts, is metaphysically impossible. 
-------------------------- 
o So it is not metaphysically necessary that human persons are 
essentially human animals: it is at least metaphysically possible that 
there are human persons that either are only accidentally animals, or 
are not animals at all. In which case (A) is false; in which case 
animalism is false. 
 
What is the relation between argument 4 and argument 1? This depends 
on how we understand what it is for a human person to be embodied. 
For the sake of brevity, let us say that a human person has* something if 
that human person either has that thing (as a part), or inhabits 
something that has that thing (as a part). On a stronger understanding 
of what it is for a human person to be embodied, a human person is 
embodied at a time in a possible world only if she has* a (whole) 
(biological) body at that time in that world .On a weaker understanding 
what it is for a human to be embodied, a human person is embodied at a 
time in a possible world only if she has* some “bodily” (i.e. material) 
parts at that time in that world. (In modal arguments against 
materialism from possible disembodiment, embodiment needs to be 
understood in the weaker way, since a purely material being needn’t be 
embodied, in the strong sense of “embodied”).  
If we understand embodiment in the first and stronger way, it seems 
that not having* extra-mental parts implies disembodiment: at least, I don’t 
see how an individual who neither has extra-mental parts, nor inhabits 
anything with extra-mental parts, could either have a (whole) 
(biological) body as a part, or inhabit a (whole) (biological) body. 
Assuming that not having* extra-mental parts implies being disembodied, we 
may conclude that if argument 4 is a sound argument against animalism, 
so too is argument 1. If on the other hand, we understand embodiment 
in the second and weaker way, there is no obvious reason to suppose 
that the soundness of argument 4 would imply the soundness of 
argument 1. Perhaps there is a metaphysically possible scenario in 
which (a) a human person loses all her extra-mental parts, (b) the 
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person’s mind continues to exist, and continues to be “involved in” 
thoughts and experiences, and (c) the human person herself continues 
to exist. (a) – (c) could all be true, even if, given what human person 
actually refers to, it is not metaphysically possible for a human person 
to exist, without having “bodily” or material parts. If that is how things 
are, argument 4 against animalism will be sound (assuming (as it seems 
safe to assume) there could not be a human animal that is as it were “all 
mind”), but argument 1 will be unsound (since human persons will be 
essentially embodied (in the weak sense of embodiment).  
We noted earlier that an animalist will challenge the idea that a human 
person’s surviving disembodiment is secondarily or metaphysically 
possible, as well as primarily possible (non-excludable a priori). In 
particular, an animalist might say that, absent a commitment to 
something like Cartesian dualism, there is no reason to suppose think 
that, given the individuals that human person actually refers to, it is 
primarily or metaphysically possible for a human person to survive 
disembodiment. 
We can now see that the proponent of argument 1 can respond to this 
challenge in either of two ways, depending on whether she has a 
stronger or weaker conception of embodiment. If she has the stronger 
conception of embodiment, she can say that, even assuming that the 
individuals human person actually refers to are purely material beings, 
there is still a reason to suppose that a human person’s surviving 
disembodiment is metaphysically possible: the reason is that it is 
metaphysically possible for a human person’s to go on existing, despite 
ceasing to have* any extra-mental parts, and for a human person to go 
on existing, despite ceasing to have* any extra-mental parts, is for that 
human person to survive disembodiment. If on the other hand, the 
proponent of argument 1 has the weaker conception of embodiment, 
she can concede to the animalist that argument 1 is unconvincing, 
inasmuch as a human person’s surviving disembodiment might or might 
not be metaphysically possible (depending on what sort of individuals 
human person actually refers to), but fall back on argument 4. For as we 
have seen—irrespective of whether the proponent of argument 1 has a 
stronger or a weaker conception of embodiment--she believes it is 
metaphysically possible for a human person to survive disembodiment, 
only because she believes it is possible for a human person to exist in a 
minded-though-disembodied state, and if she believes it is possible for a 
human person to exist in a minded-though-disembodied state, she 
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should and will believe that it is metaphysically possible for a human 
person to exist without having* any extra-mental parts. If, however, it 
is metaphysically possible for a human person to exist without having* 
any extra-mental parts, then argument 4 is sound. 
Moral: proponents of argument 1, independently of how they construe 
embodiment, and independently of their views on whether human 
beings are wholly immaterial, only partly immaterial, or wholly 
material, can endorse argument 4.  
I used to think that some and perhaps many anti-animalists rejected 
animalism, because—under the influence of certain conceptions of the 
afterlife or Meditation 6--they held that human persons will or at any 
rate could continue to exist without continuing to have* material parts 
(and they saw the incompatibility of this view with animalism). But I 
now think this gets things backwards. Those who think that a human 
person’s continuing to exist without continuing to have* material parts 
is (metaphysically) possible, think that, only because they think that a 
human person’s continuing to exist without continuing to have* extra-
mental parts is (metaphysically) possible—and they hold this last 
(animalism-excluding) view, for reasons independent of whether a 
human person could go on existing, even though she no longer had* 
material parts. If, like Aquinas, they rejected the idea that a human 
person could continue to exist without continuing to have* extra-
mental parts, they would, like Aquinas, reject the idea that it is 
metaphysically possible for a human person to go on existing, without 
continuing to have* material parts—even if, like Aquinas, they thought 
that a human person’s mind was an immaterial entity that could and 
indeed would survive the destruction of that human person’s body. 
 
 
IV 
 
Returning to our main concern, how might the animalist oppose 
argument 4? Again, I take it that the animalist does not have the option 
of taking issue with its second premiss: a view on which human persons 
are human animals, but a human person can survive as (something 
coincident with) an immaterial mind, or as (something coincident with) 
the ‘thought-involved’ part of a human brain , and a human animal can 
hold on to its animality, despite now coinciding with an immaterial 
mind, or the ‘thought-involved’ part of a human brain, is not worthy of 
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the name “animalism”. Thus the animalist will need to challenge the 
idea that a human person’s existing without having* extra-mental parts 
is metaphysically possible. 
How might this go? Argument 4’s first premiss is true as long as 
 
(i) It is metaphysically possible for a human person’s mind to continue 
to exist, despite that human person’s no longer having* any extra-
mental parts (either because that human person no longer exists 
(then), or because that human person still exists, but no longer has* 
any extra-mental parts (then)). 
And 
(ii) a human person’s mind’s continuing to exist, despite that human 
person’s no longer having* any extra-mental parts is metaphysically 
compossible with that human person’s continuing to exist. 
 
So the animalist can concede (i), but refuse to concede (ii), or refuse to 
concede either (i) or (ii). (Conceding (ii) and refusing to concede (i) is not 
an option, since (ii) implies (i).) 
The animalist could dig in her heels at (i), and say that, even if we cannot 
exclude a priori that a human person’s mind will continue to exist, 
despite that human person’s no longer having* any extra-mental parts, 
we have no reason to think that, given what human person’s mind actually 
refers to, it is metaphysically possible for a human person’s mind to 
continue to exist, despite that human person’s no longer having* any 
extra-mental parts. Perhaps, if we had a better understanding of (the 
nature of) what human person’s mind actually refers to, we would see that 
a human person’s mind could only exist as a (proper) part of the human 
person to whom it belongs.  
I doubt, though, that animalists are well advised to oppose Argument 4 
simply by casting doubt on its first premiss. Given that there are no 
uncontroversially actual cases of a human person’s mind continuing to 
exist, even though the human person who had it no longer has* any 
extra-mental parts, one might wonder how we can know that such a 
thing is metaphysically possible, as well as non-excludable a priori. Be 
that as it may, it’s hard to see what reason we have to think it is 
metaphysically impossible for a human person’s mind to continue to 
exist, even though the person who had it no longer has* any extra-
mental properties. If the animalist has good reasons to doubt the truth 
of the first premiss of Argument 4, but lacks good reasons to deny it, 
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then it would seem that the animalist lacks good reason to deny the 
soundness of argument 4—unless she has good reason to deny that 
Argument 4’s second premiss is true. And if the animalist lacks good 
reason to deny the soundness of argument 4, the animalist lacks good 
reasons to be an animalist.  
So it seems as though the animalist will need reasons (not simply to 
doubt but) to deny (ii). What might such reasons be? 
Consider the following (Cartesian) argument for dualism—henceforth, 
Argument 5: 
 
o Human persons could make it into the (immediate) future, despite 
having no material parts in the (immediate) future.. 
o Nothing wholly material could make it into the (immediate) future, 
despite having no material parts in the (immediate) future. 
-------------------------- 
o Human persons are not wholly material beings (they are either partly 
or wholly immaterial). 
 
A materialist—or at least, a materialist who is an animalist—might 
naturally respond to this argument as follows: 
 
A human person’s making into the (immediate future), despite not having 
material parts in the (immediate) future is not excludable a priori, and 
hence primarily possible. But we have reason to think it is not secondarily 
or metaphysically possible. What reasons? Well, there’s nothing more to a 
human person than a body and a mind. A human person’s body is 
manifestly a wholly material thing. But the systematic correlations 
between mental states and cerebro-cortical states show that a human 
person’s mind—the part of that person she thinks with—is, or at any rate, 
shares a decomposition with, a part of her (wholly material) brain. So a 
human person’s mind, like her body is wholly material—in which case a 
human person is wholly material. Moreover (just as the proponent of 
Argument 5 maintains), nothing wholly material could make it into the 
(immediate) future, despite having no material parts (then). Hence, the 
sort of beings that human person actually refers to (wholly material beings) 
could not make it into the (immediate) future, despite having no material 
parts in the (immediate) future. 
 
This response to Argument 5 is an instance of what William Rowe called 
a Moore shift. In a Moore shift, the defender of not-r concedes the validity 
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of the argument, p, q, therefore r, but denies its soundness, on the grounds 
that not-r, q, therefore not-p is sound. (In the case at hand, p = human 
persons could make it into the (immediate) future, despite having no material 
parts (then), q = nothing wholly material could make it into the (immediate) 
future, despite having no material parts (then), and r = human persons are not 
wholly material beings. 
The animalist can analogously concede the validity of Argument 4, but 
deny its soundness on the grounds that the argument that is sound is 
(not Argument 4 but rather) Argument 6: 
 
o It is (metaphysically) necessary that human persons are essentially 
human animals. 
o A human animal’s retaining its human animality despite not having* 
extra-mental parts, is metaphysically impossible. 
-------------------------- 
o A human person’s still existing, despite not having* extra-mental 
parts, is metaphysically impossible. 
 
If the animalist makes this move, the anti-animalist will naturally 
enough protest that the issue under debate (or rather, given that 
animalism implies (B) and (C) as well as (A), one of the issues under 
debate) is whether it is in fact (metaphysically) necessary that human 
persons are essentially human animals: why should we think it is? 
I take it the animalist will say that if all human persons are essentially 
human animals is true, it is also metaphysically necessary (so that all 
human persons are essentially human animals is like all water is composed of 
molecules, and unlike all works of art are essentially either not made of pure 
gold or not spheres with a diameter of a mile). On this assumption, the 
animalist will be able to motivate acceptance of the first premiss of 
argument 6, as long as she can motivate acceptance of human persons are 
essentially human animals. But how is she going to motivate acceptance of 
this last claim?  
Suppose it is evident, even before we start doing philosophy, that 
human persons are human animals, and it becomes evident, upon 
philosophical reflection, that whoever is a human animal, is essentially 
a human animal. Then, (on the assumption that human animals are 
essentially human animals is (metaphysically) necessary if true), we may 
conclude that Argument 6, rather than Argument 4, is sound. 
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Some animalists think that it is in fact pre-philosophically 
uncontentious that human persons are human animals—or at least, that 
it is pre-philosophically uncontentious that, if human persons are 
wholly material beings, then they are human animals: 
 
We can understand how someone might deny we are…animals by rejecting 
materialism. Many philosophers have argued that we are not material 
objects of any kind, but immaterial objects, or abstract objects akin to 
computer programs, or the like; or that we have some immaterial part. But 
once it is conceded that we are material beings of some sort, it seems quite 
obvious what sort of material beings we are: we are living animals. . . . 
[T]hat we are members of the species Homo Sapiens is certainly something 
we ordinarily assume when we are not doing philosophy. (E. Olson, The 
Human Animal, p. 95). 
 
But I am not so sure that when we are not doing philosophy, we take it 
for granted that we (human persons) are (human) animals. When we are 
“outside the study” (whether temporarily, in the case of philosophers, 
or permanently, in the case of non-philosophers), we certainly take it 
for granted that we are human persons, and human beings, but it seems 
much more doubtful that we take it for granted that we are human 
animals. To start with, I think that many non-philosophers regard it as 
obvious that animals are wholly material beings (share a decomposition 
with their (wholly material) body), but think it is an open question 
whether human persons are wholly material. And I find it hard to 
believe that all the non-philosophers who take it for granted that 
animals are wholly material beings, but do not take it for granted that 
human persons are wholly material beings, take it for granted that 
human persons are human animals. Also, so far as I can see, even a non-
philosopher who takes it for granted that human persons are wholly 
material beings needn’t take it for granted that human persons are 
human animals. For a non-philosopher (as much as a philosopher) might 
(a) be confident that human persons are wholly material beings, (b) be 
confident that that being a person is being one kind of thing, and being 
an animal is being a different kind of thing, but (c) not be confident that 
one and the same individual could simultaneously be each of those two 
different kinds of things. So far as I can see, not all materialist non-
philosophers are confident that human beings are in the intersection of 
the extension of person with the extension of animal, because not all 
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materialist non-philosophers are confident that the intersection of 
those extensions in non-empty. 
An animalist might say here that the problem here is that non-
philosophers typically use the word “animal” to mean “non-human-
animal”. If non-philosophers fail to distinguish “animal” from “non-
human animal”, then they obviously won’t be happy with the idea that 
human beings are in the intersection of the extension of person with the 
extension of animal. Similarly, an animalist might say, non-philosophers 
who confidently assent to animals are wholly material beings but do not 
assent to human persons are wholly material beings are failing to 
distinguish, or failing to clearly distinguish animal and non-human 
animal. 
 Well, I don’t know. I doubt that, if you asked a non-philosopher to define 
animal, she would necessarily bring non-humanity into the definition 
(my (admittedly uninformed) guess is that most non-philosophers 
would say that animals are living beings that can do certain things (that, 
say, plants cannot).  
What is true, I think, is that, with the right sort of priming, at least a 
great many non-philosophers can be led to affirm that human persons 
are human animals. The priming might go: what kind of thing are you? 
Are you, say, a human being? And what are human beings? Are they, say, 
a kind of animal? If a philosophy professor primes her (first-year) 
undergraduates this way, I think she will find that at least a good 
number of her students will affirm that they are human animals. Once 
an undergraduate has affirmed that he is a human animal, the professor 
can ask him whether he is a human person, and he’ll no doubt answer 
affirmatively. On this basis, the professor will be able to get the student 
to say that the human person that he is, is a human animal, and then 
generalize, and affirm that (we) human persons are human animals. 
By contrast, if the professor starts off by asking: what kind of thing are 
you? Are, you say, a person, and in particular a human person? And what 
kind of thing is a human person? Is a human person a kind of animal—a 
human animal? 
Then, I think, the professor will have a harder time getting her students 
to affirm that they are human animals as well as human persons, or that 
(we) human persons are human animals. The question, are human persons 
a kind of animal? will trigger (in non-philosophers) more reluctance to 
assent than the question are human beings a kind of animal? (An anti-
164 
 
animalist might suspect that this is because human being is ambiguous 
between human person and human animal.) 
In short, I think it is an oversimplification to say that non-philosophers, 
or even materialist non-philosophers, regard it as “quite obvious” that 
we (human persons) are animals, and in particular human animals. (In 
fairness to Olson, if I have understood the rest of the chapter of The 
Human Animal from which I took the quote above, he would not 
disagree).  
Of course, the question of whether human persons are human animals is 
obvious, even before we start doing philosophy, is of no great moment, 
if it can be made evidently true, once we do philosophy. And animalists 
have philosophical arguments that purport to make it at least 
reasonably obvious that human persons are (identical to) human 
animals. In what follows, I shall concentrate on what seems to me one of 
the most promising candidates for the “kernel” of this sort of 
argument.—Olson’s (very neat) “thinking animal” argument. The gist of 
this argument is: 
 
(1) Some animals think. In particular, the human animal with my body 
thinks. 
(2) The human person with my body thinks. 
(3) At most one individual with my body thinks. 
(4) So the human person with my body = the human animal with my 
body. 
 
As Olson would recognize, (4) falls short of each human person is (identical 
to) a human animal. Still, we might think that there is a reasonably 
uncontentious line of reasoning that will take us from (4) to the identity 
of each human person with some human animal. To start with, it would 
on the face of it be surprising if some human persons (e.g. the author of 
this piece and the reader of this piece) were (identical to) human 
animals, but other human persons were not: one would have expected 
the class of human persons (as opposed, say, to the class of persons) not 
to be heterogeneous in that way. Moreover, it is at least arguable that if 
(4) is true, so is: 
 
(5) Any thinking human person with a body is identical to the human 
animal with that body. 
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After all, it seems plausible that any thinking human person with a body 
will be a thinking human person with a human body (what would make 
a person with a non-human body a human person?) And it seems 
plausible that whenever there is a human person HP with a human body, 
there is also a human animal HA with that human body. Assuming the 
thinking animal argument is sound, it seems that HA will think, and be 
identical to HP (lest HA and HP be two different thinkers with the same 
body). 
Also, it is at least arguable that any thinking human person is a thinking 
human person with a body (again, what would make a thinking person 
without a body human?) If this is right, we could move from (5) to 
 
(6) Any thinking human person is identical to the human animal with 
that person’s body. 
 
Suppose we say that, in order to be a “thinking human person”, a human 
person doesn’t have to be (“occurrently”) thinking, but only needs to be 
“a thinker”--in Cartesian parlance “a thinking thing”. Then it is at least 
arguable that every human person is (in that sense of “thinking human 
person”) a thinking human person (that is, a thinker or “thinking 
thing”). If, however, every human person is a thinking human person, 
and every thinking human person is identical to some human animal (to 
wit, the animal with the body of that human person), it seems we may 
conclude that  
 
(7) Each human person is identical to some human animal. 
 
So, the animalist can say, perhaps human persons are (identical to) human 
animals is not pre-philosophically obvious. But (1) – (3) are pre-
philosophically obvious. (The canonical non-philosopher on the 
Clapham omnibus has no doubt that (“prototypical”) members of the 
species canis familiaris and (“prototypical”) members of the species homo 
sapiens think, and no doubt that a human person with her body thinks, 
and no doubt that there is only one thinker with her body. With just a 
little philosophical reflection upon (1) – (3), we can make it obvious that 
(4) is true. As we have seen, (4) is not the claim that each human person 
is identical to some human animal, but it is not a million miles from it, 
either; perhaps with more philosophical reflection (1) – (4), we can make 
it obvious that each human person is identical to some human animal 
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(as was suggested above). And perhaps, with a bit more philosophical 
reflection we can make the truth of (the rest of) animalism obvious.  
In fact, though, it’s not so clear to me that since (1) – (3) are all obviously 
true and obviously jointly imply (4), (4) is obviously true as well. True 
enough, even those (or perhaps especially those) who have not done 
much philosophical reflecting are strongly inclined to assent to each of 
(1) – (3), and the path from (1) – (3) to (4) is short and straight. But I think 
this provides rather less in the way of support for (4) than we might have 
thought. To see this, consider Argument 7: 
 
(1’) A sweater is a material object, and a thread is a material object. 
(2’) It never happens that two different material objects are in the 
very same place at the very same time. 
(3’) So a sweater knitted from one (very long) thread and the (very 
long) thread that the sweater was knitted from are the same material 
object (since they are manifestly in the same place at the same time). 
 
(Judging from my experience with sixth-form students and first-year 
undergraduates) Clapham bus-riders are (by and large) strongly inclined 
to assent to both (1’) and (2’), and (1’) and (2’) jointly imply (3’). But this 
provides significantly less support for (3’) than one might have thought, 
given that Clapham bus-riders are also (by and large) strongly inclined 
to assent to: 
 
(4’) Only different material objects can have different makers, 
histories, or potentialities. 
And 
(5’) The sweater knit from the (very long) thread have different 
makers, different histories, and different potentialities. 
 
--and (4’) and (5’) jointly imply that the sweater and the (very long) 
thread it was not knit from are not the same material object. Non-
philosophers—or as we might call them, ‘the folk’--are strongly inclined 
to assent to things that (jointly) imply that the sweater and the (very 
long) thread it was knit from are the very same material object, and also 
strongly inclined to assent to (other) things that (jointly) imply that the 
sweater and the (very long) thread it was knit from are not the very 
same material object. In light of this, the fact that the folk are strongly 
inclined to assent to things that (jointly) imply the identity of the thread 
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with the sweater is far from conclusive evidence in favour of the identity 
of the thread with the sweater. (For this reason, (to vary the example), 
a professor who is an able “primer” can get a good many undergraduates 
to either affirm or deny that a paper airplane = the sheet of paper it 
“coincides with”, depending on which “primer questions” she chooses). 
Similarly, it might be that the folk are strongly inclined to accept things 
that imply that human persons are (identical to) human animals, and 
also strongly inclined to accept (other) things that imply that human 
persons are not (identical to) human animals.  
Why suppose that? Remembering that strong embodiment implies 
having* a (whole) (biological) body, and weak embodiment only implies 
having* some material parts, I shall say that things that continue to 
exist, despite no longer having a (whole) (biological) body, survive weak 
disembodiment, and that things that continue to exist, despite no longer 
having any material parts at all, survive strong disembodiment. It is at least 
arguable that the folk—or at least a great many of the folk—think that 
human persons could survive weak disembodiment (assuming their 
mind survived, and continued to “work”) but human animals could not 
(and think that whenever Ks could survive something that K*s could not, 
Ks ≠ K*s). (Compare: it is at least arguable that the folk—or at least a great 
many of the folk—think that a very long thread that currently coincides 
with a knitted sweater could survive being completely “unknit”, but the 
sweater currently knit from that thread could not (and think that 
whenever Ks could survive something that K*s could not, Ks ≠ K*s).) 
The idea here is that, as the folk see it, just as there is nothing impossible 
in the idea of a non-human person’s coinciding with and sharing a 
decomposition with a non-human mind, there is nothing impossible in 
the idea of a human person’s coinciding with and sharing a 
decomposition with her human mind. Just as the archangel Gabriel 
might (permanently) coincide with and share a decomposition with his 
angelic mind, a human person might (temporarily) coincide with and 
share a decomposition with her human mind. For the folk, persons as 
such are the kind of things that could coincide and share a 
decomposition with their mind, in the same way that kitchen knives, as 
such, are the kind of things that could coincide with their (largest) 
central part. (Imagine a kitchen knife consisting of a central metal or 
ceramic part, and two wooden or plastic handles. The knife will 
“outvolume” its central part; but if the knife loses it handles, it will 
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shrink into coincidence and “co-decomposability” with its (largest) 
central part.) 
Here a champion of animalism might object that we must be careful not 
to over-attribute beliefs to the folk. The folk no doubt believe that a 
human person’s coinciding with and being co-decomposable with her 
mind is not something that can be excluded a priori. So they believe it is 
primarily possible, or “epistemically possible”, in Chalmer’s sense of 
“epistemically possible”. They may also believe that it is epistemically 
possible in the more straightforward sense of the term. That is, they may 
believe that we cannot exclude a human person’s mind coinciding with 
and being co-decomposable with her mind (at some (possibly future) 
time) on either a priori or a posteriori grounds. But why should we 
suppose that they think it is secondarily or metaphysically possible? In 
other words, why should we suppose that the folk judge that some human 
person has coincided with and been de-composable with or will coincide with 
and be co-decomposable her mind is not only not excludable a priori, and 
for all we know true, but is also genuinely possible, given what human 
person and human mind actually refer to? The question is crucial to the 
issue under discussion, because if we cannot attribute to the folk the 
belief that a human person’s coinciding with and being co-
decomposable with her mind is secondarily possible, there is no obvious 
reason to think that, although some things the folk take for granted (to 
wit, (1) – (3)) imply that the person with their body = the animal with 
their body, other things the folk take for granted (concerning the 
persistence conditions of human persons and the persistence conditions 
of human animals) imply that the person with their body ≠ the animal 
with their body.  
The question of which modal beliefs we can attribute to the folk is a large 
and difficult one. I think (as I take it Kripke thinks, judging from his 
remarks about the “intuitive content” of essentialist claims, and about 
the epistemic and metaphysical senses of it could have turned out that) 
that even if the folk do not talk explicitly about primary and secondary 
possibility, they do understand what it is for p to be non-excludable 
independently of experience, what it is for p to be non-excludable given 
everything we know, and what it is for p to be the sort of thing that could 
have been be true (given what the words in p actually refer to). 
Moreover, I think that the folk have views about which statements p are 
in fact non-excludable independently of experience, and about which 
statements p are in fact non-excludable, given everything we know, and 
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about which statements p could in fact have been be true (given what 
the words in p actually refer to).  
We can elicit folk views about what is possible (in the various sense of 
possible under discussion) by asking the folk the right questions. If we 
want to know whether the folk think that water’s existing though 
hydrogen doesn’t is primarily possible (epistemically possible in 
Chalmers’s sense) we can ask them whether water’s existing though 
hydrogen does not could be ruled out independently of experience (if 
they answer ‘no’, then they think water’s existing though hydrogen does 
not is primarily possible; if they answer ‘yes’, then they think water’s 
existing though hydrogen does not is not primarily possible). 
If we want to know whether the folk think water’s existing though 
hydrogen does not is epistemically possible in the (stronger and more 
natural) sense of “epistemically possible”, we ask them whether, for all 
they know, water exists, though hydrogen doesn’t (if they answer ‘yes’, 
then they think water’s existing though hydrogen does not is 
epistemically possible (in the stronger and more natural sense); if they 
answer ‘no’ (as presumably some better chemically informed members 
of the folk will), then they think water’s existing though hydrogen does 
not is not epistemically possible (in the stronger and more natural 
sense). Finally, if we want to know whether the folk think that water’s 
existing though hydrogen did not is secondarily or metaphysically 
possible, we ask them whether there could have been water without 
hydrogen, given what water and hydrogen actually refer to (given the 
kinds of things water and hydrogen actually are). 
Similarly, we can ask the folk whether a human person’s coinciding with 
and sharing a decomposition with her mind can be ruled out 
independently of experience, whether it can be ruled out, given 
everything they know, and whether it could have happened that some 
human person coincided with her mind, given what human person and 
mind actually refer to. My sense is that many if not most of the folk would 
be happy to say that a human person’s coinciding with and sharing a 
decomposition with her mind is not just something that cannot be 
excluded a priori, but also something that might have been so, given 
what human person and mind refer to. For my money, the reason that so 
many philosophers think that a human person’s coinciding with and 
sharing a decomposition with her mind is secondarily or metaphysically 
possible, is that they believed that it was secondarily or metaphysically 
possible when they belonged to the folk, and they didn’t give up that 
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belief when they became philosophers. In any case, I know of no good 
reason to suppose that the folk would not want to say that a human 
person’s coinciding with and sharing a decomposition with her mind is 
something that might have been so, given what human person and mind 
actually refer to. If there is no good reason to suppose that the folk 
would not regard a human person’s coinciding with and sharing a 
decomposition with her mind as secondarily or metaphysically possible, 
then we cannot rule out that some of the things non-philosophers take 
for granted imply that human persons are (identical to) human animals, 
and some of the things non-philosophers take for granted that human 
persons are not (identical to) human animals, and that the “thinking 
animal” is accordingly no more conclusive than the parallel argument 
for the identity of the sweater knitted from the one long thread with the 
one long thread the sweater was knitted from. 
At this point, an animalist might say: 
 
Perhaps many if not most of the folk accept things that imply the 
metaphysical possibility of a human person’s coinciding with and sharing 
a decomposition with her mind, as well as the metaphysical impossibility 
of a human animal’s coinciding with and sharing a decomposition with its 
mind. After all, not a few of the folk accept that they not only could but in 
fact will someday coincide with and share a decomposition with their mind 
(in the interval between their death and last-day resurrection, perhaps). 
These members of the folk accept the truth of some human person coincides 
with and shares a decomposition with her mind at some time, and truth implies 
weak epistemic possibility, strong epistemic possibility, and metaphysical 
possibility. Be that as it may, it is evident that the human person with my body 
= the human animal with my body is incompatible with human persons have 
different persistence conditions from human animals (only different things have 
different persistence conditions). And once the ‘thinking animal argument’ 
is on the table, we can see that that if we have to choose between the human 
person with my body = the human animal with my body and human persons have 
different persistence conditions from human animals, the one to plump for is the 
thinking human person with my body = the thinking human animal with my body. 
Surely the conjunction of the human animal with my body is a thinker with 
there is at most one thinker with my body is more “un-give-up-able” than it is 
(metaphysically) possible for a human person to coincide with and share a 
decomposition with her mind. 
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Why surely? I am happy to admit that I find it hard to doubt the 
conjunction of human animals as well as human persons may be said to think 
with there is only one thinker with my body. So I find it hard to doubt that 
the person with my body = the animal with my body. That said, I don’t 
find it easy to doubt that it is metaphysically possible for a human mind 
existing at the present time tpr to exist and “work” (i.e., be involved in 
thoughts and experiences) at a future time tf even though the human 
person who has* extra-mental parts at tpr no longer has* any extra-
mental parts at tf, and even though no other human person, and indeed 
no other subject, has that mind (as a proper part) at tf. Now it might seem 
that the question of whether a mind currently had* by a human person 
could exist (and work) “in isolation” at a time when the human person 
no longer has* extra-mental parts, is independent from the question of 
whether a human person who now has* extra-mental parts could at a 
future time coincide with and share a decomposition with her mind. 
Compare: it seems true that a car engine that currently belongs to a car 
could exist and work at a future time (exist, and be involved in the right 
sort of events (controlled explosions taking place in cylinders, etc.)), 
even though that car engine no longer belonged to that car, or anything 
else (so that the engine existed “in isolation”), and even though that car 
no longer had “extra-engine” parts. But it does not seem true that a car 
that now has all the usual parts could at some future time coincide with 
and share a decomposition with its engine: a car engine can at most 
partly constitute a car. (Hence it would be true at the future time that 
the car no longer had extra-engine parts, not because the car had shrunk 
into “coincidence and comateriation” with its engine, but because the 
car no longer existed, and thus no longer had any parts). 
In fact, though, as Olson is aware (cf. “A Counterattack” in chapter 5 of 
The Human Animal) the question of whether a human mind now had* by 
a human person could exist (and work) in isolation at a (future) time 
when the human person no longer had* extra-mental parts is linked to 
the question of whether a human person could at some (future) time 
coincide with and share a decomposition with her mind in the following 
way: giving an affirmative answer to the first question and a negative 
answer to the second has seriously counterintuitive consequences. 
I take it that if a mind is “working”—that is, involved in thoughts and 
experiences—the thoughts and experiences that the mind is involved in 
must be thoughts and experiences of some subject (no thought or 
experience is so to speak res nullius). Assume that at some future time tf, 
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the mind you currently have* is isolated, but still involved in thoughts 
and experiences, and the human person you are no longer has* any 
extra-mental parts. If thoughts and experiences necessarily belong to 
some subject, then the thoughts and experiences the (then) isolated 
mind is involved in at tf belong to some subject. Who or what is the 
subject of those thoughts and experiences? Assuming that a human 
person cannot coincide with and share a decomposition with her mind, 
that subject cannot be you: if the subject of the thoughts and 
experiences an isolated mind is involved were you, then you would 
coincide and share a decomposition with that isolated mind. So the 
subject must be someone ≠ you. Is it a “brand new” subject of 
experience—that is, a subject who didn’t exist when you had* extra-
mental parts and your mind was un-isolated? As Olson grants, it seems 
deeply weird to suppose that making a human person cease to have* 
extra-mental parts, while keeping the mind of that person existing and 
working, necessarily involves bringing a new subject—or indeed, 
anything at all—into existence: the process under discussion seems 
subtractive, rather than additive). 
What are the other options? Well, we could say that the subject of the 
thoughts and experiences the isolated mind is involved in is something 
that already existed when you had*extra-mental parts, and your mind 
became isolated. That thing would presumably be your mind. If we go 
this route, we can say that making a human person cease to have* extra-
mental parts and isolating her mind and keeping it “functioning” need 
not involve bringing anything new into existence. But then we face the 
question: when your mind was had* by you, was it (already, even then) 
a subject of experience? If it wasn’t, then making you cease to have* 
extra-mental parts, and isolating your mind, and keeping it functional, 
“subjectified” something that had not previously been a subject: it 
turned something that didn’t think or experience into something that 
did. (At least as I read Aquinas, this is his view: he supposes that in statu 
viatoris the human person with a material body and an immaterial 
intellective soul is the thinking subject, and the intellective soul is the 
proper part she thinks with (the proper part “involved” in her 
thoughts), but when the human person dies, the human person ceases 
to exist (and thus ceases to have any extra-mental parts) and the 
immaterial intellective soul continues to exist in isolation (say, in 
purgatory), and undergoes “subjectification”: a disembodied soul in 
purgatory, rather than being involved in the thoughts of a new (“death-
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born”) subject of experience, is a “freshly subjectified” subject of 
experience.) This again seems weird. Suppose that your mind has up to 
now been involved in predominantly enjoyable experiences, and that 
after you have ceased to have* extra-mental parts, and your mind has 
been isolated, it will continue to be involved in predominantly enjoyable 
experiences. Then it seems that your mind “has something to gain” from 
isolation: it thereby gets to do something good it could never do before-
-(to wit, have (to be the subject of) enjoyable experiences! Supposing 
that, in the envisioned circumstances, a (mind that was) a non-thinker 
and non-experiencer becomes a (mind that is) a thinker and experiencer 
seems wrong in exactly the same way it seems wrong to suppose that 
when we cut off Tibbles’ tail, (a bit of matter that was) a non-cat becomes 
(a bit of matter that is) a cat. 
This suggests that perhaps we should say that the now isolated but still 
working mind not only is a subject of experience now, but was one all 
along (even before its isolation). That way, we avoid both the weirdness 
of “subject creation” by a process that don’t look “creative”, and 
subjectification by isolation. But it seems non-negotiable that, when the 
now isolated was had* by a human person, that human person was a 
subject of experience. Assuming that the human person ≠ the mind that 
is first un-isolated, and subsequently isolated, we end up with the “too 
many thinkers” problem again: on the face of it, it is no less 
counterintuitive to suppose that I and my mind are two different 
thinkers, than it is to suppose that the human person with my body and 
the human animal with my body are two different thinkers. 
We could avoid the too many thinkers problem by insisting that I and 
my are not different thinkers, but the very same thinker, inasmuch as I 
just am my mind. If, however, I = my mind, then, irrespective of whether 
my mind is a Cartesian substance, or a Thomistic immaterial substantial 
form, or something identical to or at least coincident and comateriate 
with a part of my brain, it will turn out that I (and other human persons) 
don’t walk, or weigh more than one hundred pounds, or the like. And it 
seems no less counterintuitive to deny that some human persons walk, 
weigh more than one hundred pounds, and so on, than it does to deny 
that some animals think. 
(Suppose on the other hand that you think both animals and minds are 
the wrong kind of thing to think or experience. Then you can accept that 
a mind once had* by a human person can continue to be involved in 
thoughts and experiences, even though it has been isolated, and the 
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human person that had* it no longer has any extra-mental parts, and 
reject all the unpalatable options discussed above. You can say: when a 
human person ceases to have* any extra-mental parts, the human 
animal that shares a body with that human person goes out of existence. 
The human person does not go out of existence; instead she shrinks into 
“coincidence and co-materiation” with a part of her brain, or perhaps 
shrinks into “coincidence and co-immateriation” with her immaterial 
intellective soul. Either way, the mind’s undergoing isolation, and the 
person’s ceasing to have* extra-mental parts, does not bring a new 
subject of experience into existence, or subjectify something that was 
previously only potentially a subject. And either way, we have just one 
thinker (the same thinker), both before and after the brain is isolated, 
and the human person ceases to have* extra-mental parts). 
Let’s take stock. The animalist and the anti-animalist agree that, even 
before we start doing philosophy, or even if we never do philosophy, we 
are strongly inclined to accept things that imply the human person with 
my body = the human animal with my body. The animalist holds that, when 
we do philosophy, we should accordingly regard it as obvious that the 
human person with my body = the human animal with my body. A non-
animalist will naturally respond that this is too quick, because it 
arguably is the case that as well as being strongly inclined to accept 
things that imply that the human person with my body = the human 
animal with my body, non-philosophers and “pre-philosophers” are also 
strongly inclined to accept things that imply that it’s not the case that 
the human person with my body = the human animal with my body (viz. 
claims about the conditions under which human persons and human 
animals continue to exist). 
In the case of persons and animals, as in the case of threads and 
sweaters, non-philosophers and “pre-philosophers” are plausibly 
regarded as inclined to make judgments about the link between 
coincidence or something akin to coincidence and identity (there are no 
two material objects in exactly the same place, there are no two thinkers 
with my body) that are incompatible with the judgments they are 
inclined to make about the persistence conditions of the things that 
coincide (or something like coincide). The animalist can then counter 
that even if the non-animalist is right about pre-philosophers and non-
philosophers having conflicting intuitions, it should be clear upon 
reflection that we have to go with the intuitions that favor the truth of 
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the human person with my body = the human animal with my body (the 
intuitions the thinking animal argument relies on).  
This I do not see. The animalist argues along these lines: 
 
o Once we have reflected on the thinking animal argument, it becomes 
obvious that the human person with my body = the human animal with my 
body is true.  
o It is obvious that if the human person with my body = the human 
animal with my body, then human persons and human animals are 
not beings with different persistence conditions. 
-------------------------- 
o So (once we have reflected on the thinking animal argument) it 
becomes obvious that human persons and human animals do not have 
different persistence conditions. 
 
Suppose someone thinks it is clearly metaphysically possible for a 
human mind to exist and ‘work’ in isolation, after the human person to 
whom it belonged has ceased to have* extra-mental parts. Then he can 
argue as follows: 
 
o Once we reflect on what would and would not be true, if a human mind 
existed and worked in isolation, after the human person to whom it 
belonged had ceased to have* extra-mental parts, we can see that 
human persons and human animals have different persistence 
conditions. 
o It is obvious that if human persons and human animals have different 
persistence conditions, then the human person with my body ≠ the 
human animal with my body. 
-------------------------- 
o So (once we have reflected on the (metaphysical) compossibility of my 
mind’s continuing to exist and work with my ceasing to have* extra-
mental parts) it is obvious that human animals and human persons 
have different persistence conditions, and that the human animal 
with my body ≠ the human animal with my body. 
 
Suppose, though, that someone thinks it is not clear whether a human 
mind’s continuing to exist and work is (metaphysically) compossible 
with the human person to whom that mind belonged ceasing to have* 
extra-mental parts. She can still resist the animalist’s argument for the 
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(upon reflection) obviousness of the human person with my body = the 
human animal with my body. For, without committing herself to the 
metaphysical possibility of a mind’s continuing to exist and ‘work’ after 
it has been isolated, and the human person to whom it belonged has 
ceased to have* extra-mental parts, she can still Moore-shift the 
animalist’s argument for the (upon reflection) obviousness of the human 
person with my body = the human animal with my body as follows: 
 
o It is not obvious that it is metaphysically impossible for a human mind 
to go on existing, and go on being involved in thoughts and 
experiences, even though it is isolated, and the human person to 
which it belonged no longer has* extra-mental parts. 
o Once we have reflected on what would and would not be true if the 
scenario just described obtained, we can see that if it is not obvious 
that a human mind could not exist in isolation, even after the human 
person to which it belonged has ceased to have* extra-mental parts, 
then it is also not obvious that human persons and human animals 
have the same persistence conditions.  
o Moreover, it is obvious that if human persons and human persons do 
not have the same persistence conditions, then the human person 
with my body ≠ the human animal with my body. 
-------------------------- 
o So--despite the animalist’s argument to the contrary--it isn’t after all 
obvious (after philosophical reflection) that the human person with 
my body = the human animal with my body. 
  
To my mind, this Moore-shifted argument for the non-obviousness 
(even after philosophical reflection) of the human person with my body = 
the human animal with my body is at least as plausible as the animalist 
argument for its (post philosophical reflection) obviousness. 
But isn’t it crazy to think there are two thinkers with my body, and crazy 
to think that (human) animals don’t think? I don’t think either option is 
crazy, exactly. A four-dimensionalist could tell a story about how two 
thinkers could share my body, and—pace Judith Jarvis Thomson—I 
wouldn’t go so far as to say four-dimensionalism is a ‘crazy metaphysic’. 
But suppose that the view that two thinkers share my body is utterly 
indefensible (say, because, as Olson thinks, it has disastrous 
epistemological implications). I don’t see that the same goes for the view 
that (ovine, canine, cetacean…and human) animals don’t think.  
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Here is an analogy. Physicists often talk about things they call “bodies”—
things that move, accelerate, orbit, collide, and so on. Now what sort of 
things are, say, the bodies involved in a collision? It is very natural to 
suppose that two colliding bodies might both be naturalia—an asteroid 
might collide with the moon—but equally one or both of two colliding 
bodies might be artificialia—Russell’s “celestial teapot” might collide 
with a comet, or two celestial teapots might collide with each other. So, 
we might say, both naturalia and artificialia are bodies. 
But if—as I believe—artefacts with different persistence conditions can 
be coincident and comateriate, and if the way physicists count bodies 
involved in collisions is right, then artefacts cannot after all be “bodies” 
in the physicist’s sense. For consider a collision between a dog and a 
sweater knitted from one very long thread. A physicist would describe 
this as a two-body collision. If, however, the sweater is a body, and the 
thread is a body, then the sweater and the thread are different bodies 
(since x and y are different bodies if and only if x is a body, and y is a 
body, and x ≠ y)—in which case the collision that involves the dog and 
sweater involves (at least) three bodies. So either the sweater or the 
thread must not be a body. But neither of the pair {the sweater knit from 
the one long thread, the one long thread the sweater was knitted from} 
has a better claim than the other to be a body. So neither the sweater 
nor the long thread is a body. Both the sweater and the thread are things 
that coincide with and are comateriate with the one body that collides 
with the dog. (What sort of thing would that one body be? Something 
like a mass of ultimate matter, in the Lockean sense of “mass”, perhaps). 
Now if we can say that artefacts aren’t proprie loquendo bodies, but only 
material objects that are coincident with and comateriate with bodies, 
why can’t we say that (ovine, canine, cetacean….human) animals are not 
proprie loquendo thinkers, but only organisms that are coincident and 
comateriate with thinkers? Is the view that—at least for all we know—
animals at most coincide with thinkers, just as artefacts at most coincide 
with bodies, unmotivated? Again, not if—at least for all we know—a 
human can mind can exist and work in isolation, even though the 
human person to whom it belong no longer has* any extra-mental parts, 
so that—at least for all we know—human persons and human animals, 
like artefacts and bodies in the physicist’s sense, are different kinds of 
things. 
I have tried to explain—I hope in less than tedious detail—why, although 
I used to consider the thinking animal argument convincing, I now only 
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consider it ‘respectable’ or ‘defensible’ (in the sense that it is a logically 
valid argument that has considerable intuitive appeal, and is not 
evidently unsound). 
But suppose for the sake of argument that the thinking animal argument 
is sound. It seems to me there is more daylight between the soundness 
of the thinking animal argument and the truth of animalism than one 
might suppose (and than I used to suppose). 
Imagine that it is the thirty first century, and you have a canine pet 
called Argo. Sadly, Argo contracts a very bad disease. The disease will 
(soon) make Argo’s heart, lungs, and liver unviable. A veterinary 
surgeon can transplant new vital organs “into” Argo, but the disease will 
(swiftly) make those transplanted organs unviable as well. However 
much transplanting surgeons do, in the attempt to ensure that Argo still 
has viable vital organs, in the end, Argo will no longer have a functioning 
heart, or functioning lungs, or a functioning liver. But the disease does 
not affect the tissues that constitute Argo’s mind. And in the thirty first 
century, veterinary neurosurgeons can ‘isolate’ that mind, and keep it 
alive and involved in thoughts and experiences. (With the help of 
computer scientists), they can also ensure that the thoughts and 
experiences that Argo’s isolated mind is involved in are very like the 
thoughts and experiences Argo had up to the time at which she 
contracted the disease: they can put Argo’s mind in a simulated reality 
of a more benign sort than the one in “The Matrix”. 
If veterinary neurosurgeons do that, there will be a subject of the 
thoughts and experiences that Argo’s mind is involved in. For reasons 
already set out, that subject will either be a new subject brought into 
existence by the isolation of Argo’s mind, or an already existing 
individual “subjectified” by the isolation of Argo’s mind, or Argo herself. 
But again, it seems strange to suppose that the neurosurgeons bring a 
new subject of experience into existence, or “subjectify” a canine mind 
that had previously been a subject in potentia tantum. 
The alternative is that the neurosurgeons relocate Argo in a vat, and 
generate a simulated reality for her. And it seems that you might 
naturally enough think of things this way. For suppose that the doctors 
at the veterinary hospital have told you that there is no way to make it 
go on being true (for very long) that Argo has a heart, or lungs, or a liver, 
but there is a way to make it go on being be true (for a long time) that 
Argo’s mind exists in isolation, and is involved in (non-veridical) 
experiences that mimic her happy (pre-illness) experiences. You want 
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to do what’s best for Argo. And you might well think that what’s best for 
Argo is that you ask the neurosurgeons (and the computer technicians) 
to get to work. That way—you might well think—Argo will go on having 
happy experiences for a long time.  
It is true that many of the experiences had by the subject of the 
experiences Argo’s isolated mind is involved in will be “sham” 
experiences (that subject won’t really chase balls, or chew on bones, or 
cool off on summer days by jumping into the Thames, but only “have 
the experience of” doing those things). So, assuming that Argo = the 
subject of the experiences Argo’s isolated mind is involved in, Argo has 
“sham” experiences. Yes: but even if we assume that it’s a pro tanto bad 
thing for Argo to have sham experiences, isn’t it better for Argo to go on 
having happy experiences, at the cost of having many sham 
experiences, than for Argo to avoid sham experiences, at the cost of 
ceasing to exist (or being put in a non-simulated reality that is toto coelo 
different from (and much grimmer than) the one she knew before she 
became ill)? 
Also, suppose that you (outside the vat) can interact with Argo (in the 
vat). Suppose that Argo, in her vat, has a kind of “avatar” that you can 
see and interact with on your computer or TV screen, in the way that 
someone can interact with a video-game character on a screen when he 
is playing Nintendo Wi. Using your “super-Wi” equipment, you can 
“virtually” toss a stick. When you do that, Argo (in her vat) will seem to 
see you tossing a stick. She will accordingly perform the basic actions of 
trying to run after the stick, trying to pick it up, and trying to bring it 
back to you. After she has performed those actions, you can “virtually” 
take the stick from the Argo-avatar, and “virtually” scratch the Argo-
avatar behind her ears. That will make Argo (the real Argo in her vat, 
not Argo’s avatar on the screen) happy. So, it is not unnatural to think 
that if you let the neurosurgeons and computer scientists get to work, 
the result will be not just that Argo has lots more happy experiences, 
but also that you and Argo go on sharing a life. Argo will have genuine 
rather than sham experiences of playing with you (that is, she really will 
be playing with you, even if she’s not really holding sticks with her 
teeth), and these genuine experiences will contribute meaning to Argo’s 
life (and to yours). 
I have already argued that, when we reflect on human mind-isolating 
scenarios, we can see that it is not obvious that you could not come to 
coincide with and be comateriate with your mind. If I am right, by the 
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same reasoning, it is not obvious that Argo could not come to coincide 
with and be comateriate with her mind. But if Argo is an individual that 
could shrink into coincidence and comateriation with her mind, then 
what is Argo? Well, she is a “canine subject” (a “canine quasi-person”). 
But is she a dog? Is she an animal? 
We have a number of opt
canine animals, and canine animals cannot shrink into coincidence and 
comateriation with their minds; hence in the same way that a sweater is 
not a physical body, and a human person is not a human animal, Argo is 
n
unless Argo’s mind is isolated, Argo is a dog, and a canine animal, though 
Argo is only accidentally a dog and a canine animal, inasmuch as there 
are (Argo-mind-isolating) metaphysically possible scenarios in which 
Argo continues to exist, but ceases to be a dog or a canine animal, as a 
result of having lost (all) her extra-mental parts. Alternatively, we might 
being a dog and a canine animal, even after she has shrunk into 
coincidence and comateriation with her mind. 
—it arguably 
stretches our concepts of caninity and animality past the breaking point, 
I don’t thi
dog, or a canine animal, any more than a human person is a human 
animal, then we’ll presumably also have to say that Aurora—my older 
daughter’s “canine pet”—is not a dog or a canine animal (but only a 
canine subject that coincides with and is comateriate with a dog and 
canine animal). But it’s at best very surprising that Aurora is not a 
labrador retriever, a dog, and an animal. 
The moral would seem to be that it is not a foregone conclusion that the 
things the folk call both “dogs” and “animals” (e.g. Aurora) have the 
persistence conditions that animalists attribute to organisms. More 
generally, it is not a foregone conclusion that all the things the folk call 
“animals” have the persistence conditions that animalists attribute to 
organisms. Perhaps the things that the folk are happy to call 
“unthinking animals” have the persistence conditions animalists 
attribute to organisms, and the things that the folk are happy to call 
“thinking animals” (ovine animals, canine animals, feline animals….and 
human animals) have different persistence conditions. 
If this is so, however, then there is no short and straight path from the 
human person with my body = the human animal with my body—or even from 
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the more general human persons = human animals—to full-fledged 
animalism. An anti-animalist will be able to say that animalists are right 
to maintain that human animals and human persons have the same 
persistence conditions, but wrong about what those persistence 
conditions are (and, more generally, are wrong about what the 
persistence conditions of thinking animals are). Moreover, she can say, 
either (i) animalists are wrong about the persistence condition of 
various sorts of organisms (ovine, canine, cetacean….and human 
organisms), or (ii) (if animalists have got the persistence conditions of 
(all) organisms right), human animals ≠ human organisms, and canine 
animals ≠ canine organisms (in which case, it seems plausible to suppose, 
human or canine organisms do not think, lest we end up with too many 
thinkers with my (or Aurora’s) body). An animalist might object that 
option (ii) above is hopeless, because on it, even if there aren’t two 
thinkers with my body, there will be two living beings with my body (a 
human animal, and a human organism) and this is crazy. But why is there 
are two different living beings with my body any less entertainable than there 
are two different material objects made from this yarn (where the objects in 
question might be the sweater knit from the long thread, and the long 
thread the sweater had been knit from)? An animalist might say that if 
the human organism with my body were a different living being from 
the human animal with my body, the human organism would have to be 
a different thinker from the human animal with my body. But this last 
conditional is not obvious to me. It seems that we can make sense of the 
idea that although an isolated mind coincides with and is co-materiate 
with (or co-immateriate with) someone who was once a human person, 
the isolated mind is not a thinker, and the (ex-human) person the mind 
coincides with is. If so, then presumably we can make sense of the idea 
that although a human organism coincides with and is co-materiate 
with a human animal, the organism is not a thinker, although the animal 
is. 
 
 
V 
 
For the avoidance of doubt: nothing I have said implies that animalism 
is indefensible, or even clearly less defensible than at least one of the 
alternatives to it. And I don’t believe that animalism is clearly less 
defensible than the alternatives to it that are usually discussed. (On the 
182 
 
contrary, I think animalism is more defensible than any “neo-Lockean” 
view on which (a) the persistence of a human person implies the 
persistence of a mind, and (b) no “compositional continuity” is required 
for the persistence of a human person, inasmuch as the persistence of a 
human person could be secured simply by the (non-branching) transfer 
of “information” from something existing at an earlier time to 
something compositionally disjoint from it existing in the (immediate) 
future.) 
That said, for reasons I have tried to make clear, I am much more 
receptive than I once was to the idea that animalism has strongly 
counterintuitive consequences. It may be that the same is true about all 
the competitors to animalism. Perhaps no theory of the nature and 
persistence conditions of human persons is one we’ll ever be entirely 
happy with. 
Like Olson (and unlike Shoemaker, Lewis, et multi alii aliaeque) I want to 
say that unless or until we start doing philosophy, we have no 
inclination to think that the existence or persistence of a human person 
implies the existence or persistence of her mind. (Outside the study) we 
think that necessarily, we have been in existence for as long as we have 
been alive, but we do not think that necessarily, we have had a mind for 
as long as we have been alive (pre-philosophically, you were alive then, but 
you didn’t yet have a mind sounds just as possible to us as you were alive 
then, but you didn’t yet have fingernails). But unlike Olson (and like 
Shoemaker, Lewis, et multi alii aliaeque), I want to say that unless or until 
we start doing philosophy, we have no inclination to think that the 
existence or persistence of a human person implies her being or 
continuing to be a human animal. (Outside the study) we think that a 
human person’s existing/continuing to exist without being/continuing 
to be a human animal is possible (whether or not we think it’s something 
that ever happens). (This is because we are inclined to think that a 
human person could coincide with mind, and disinclined to think a 
being without extra-mental parts could be a human animal). If, however, 
our existing (persisting) requires neither that we are (continue to be) 
human animals, nor that we have (continue to have) minds, it is hard to 
see what our nature and persistence conditions could be. The difficulty 
is that we intuit that the nature and persistence conditions of human 
persons are as it were “non-disjunctive”, and it’s hard to see how a 
theory of our nature and persistence which allows us to antedate our 
minds, and postdate our human animality (or at any rate postdate our 
183 
 
coinciding with or inhabiting a human animal), can avoid the 
consequence that human persons have a “disjunctive” nature, and 
“disjunctive” persistence conditions. So, when we try to set out a 
philosophical account of the nature and persistence conditions of 
human persons, we end up in a state of aporia. And there’s no guarantee 
that, with a little (or even a lot) more reflection, we will be able to get 
beyond our aporia. Compare: thinking about how—if at all—free choice 
is possible or thinking about how—if at all—there can be both heaps and 
non-heaps generates aporiai. Philosophers have been trying—to my 
mind unsuccessfully—to resolve these aporiai for a long time, and they 
may or may not someday succeed. 
On the other hand, my pessimism may be misplaced, and there may be 
an account of the persistence conditions of human persons (and canine 
quasi-persons) that (1) either accommodates or satisfyingly explains 
away our intuition that a human person could antedate her mentality, 
(2) either accommodates or satisfyingly explains away our intuition that 
a human person could postdate her animality (or at any rate postdate 
coinciding with or inhabiting a human animal), and (3) is not 
unappealingly “disjunctive”. If there is such an account, I suspect it will 
be neither animalist nor “mentalist”, and will be more accommodating 
to our pre-philosophical intuitions about the persistence of you and me 
and Argo and Aurora than both animalist accounts (whether of the 
Aristotelian or the contemporary variety) and mentalist accounts 
(whether of the Cartesian, or the Thomistic, or the Lockean or neo-
Lockean variety). But I shall leave these questions for another time and 
place. 
  
